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does not solve all the problems in this area. If, after a separate determination is made, the confession is found to be involuntary, must the court
impanel a new jury to determine the guilt or innocence? If this were not
done, the jury might be influenced by the involuntary confession as was
pointed out in the Jackson case. 16
It should be noted that the Court in the Jackson case for the first time
rejected the presumption that juries follow the instructions of the court. 17
The Court made an objective appraisal of the presumption, and found it to
be unsound because under certain circumstances a jury cannot consciously
obey the court's instructions. The denial of the presumption that juries
follow the court's instructions indicates that in the future the Court will be
carefully examining the jury's duties during a trial to determine whether
they are capable of fulfilling these duties under the circumstances involved.
The Jackson case may be the start of a revision of American law concerning
the jury system.
R. EVANS

To
Mosby v.

TORTS-STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS IN A MALPRACTICE ACTION HELD
HAVE STARTED RUNNING

AT THE TIME OF THE OPERATION-In

Michael Reese Hospital, 49 Ill. App. 2d 336, 199 N.E.2d 633 (1st Dist. 1964),
the Illinois Appellate Court for the First District was confronted with the
problem of when the statute of limitations should begin to run in an action
for a negligently performed surgical operation.
The plaintiff, Rowena Mosby, was operated on by agents of the
defendant hospital on March 25, 1956. On December 30, 1960, the plaintiff
underwent a second operation at another hospital. It was then discovered
for the first time that a needle had been left in the plaintiff's body during
the first operation. The needle had, by the time of the second operation,
passed into the area of the plaintiff's right knee and had caused serious
permanent damage.
The complaint consisted of two counts. The first count alleged that the
defendant's agents had negligently deposited a surgical needle in the plaintiff's body during the operation and had failed to remove it at the conclusion thereof. The second count repeated the allegations of the first count but
16 Another question likely to be presented to the Court will be whether the so-called
Massachusetts rule is constitutional. Under the Massachusetts rule the judge hears all the
evidence and rules on voluntariness before allowing the confession into evidence. If he
finds the confession voluntary, the jury is then instructed that it must also find that the
confession was voluntary before it may consider it, Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368, 417,
84 Sup. Ct. 1774, 1802 (1964). Some courts and commentators have been unable to see
any difference between the New York rule and the Massachusetts rule. Whatever the
theoretical variance, in practice the rules are likely to show a distinction without a true
difference.
17 Cf. Krulewitch v. United States, 336 U.S. 440, 453, 69 Sup. Ct. 716, 723 (1949)

(concurring opinion); Comment, 24 U. of Chi. L. Rev. 710 (1957).
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added that the defendant had fraudulently concealed from the plaintiff the
fact that the needle was still in her body. 1
Upon motion by the defendant to dismiss the complaint in its entirety
on the ground that the statute of limitations had expired, 2 the trial court
granted the defendant's motion as to the first count, but denied it as to the
second. The plaintiff appealed the dismissal of count one, but the defendant
waived appeal of the denial of his motion to dismiss the second count. The
appellate court, affirming the ruling of the trial court, held that the first
count of the complaint was barred by the statute of limitations. Its decision
was grounded on the theory that the statute of limitations had begun to
run immediately upon the completion of the operation.
Basic to the determination of whether the statute of limitations has
expired in any malpractice case is the nature of the action. That is, does
the complaint sound in contract or in tort? Originally the gravamen of such
an action was breach of contract. As one writer has stated:
Malpractice in the pertinent legal literature is inextricably bound
up with the idea of breach of implied contract. This was especially
true of the older cases wherein malpractice was regarded simply as
a form of breach of implied contract. The physician or surgeon was
spoken of as impliedly holding himself out as possessing the degree
ordinarily possessed by the proof learning, skill, and experience
3
fession in similar localities.
The courts eventually took cognizance of the tort aspect of malpractice
litigation, however, and presently the majority of jurisdictions view such an
action as sounding in tort rather than contract.4 This is not to imply that
one can not sue in such an instance on a breach of contract theory. Where
it is clear from the wording of the complaint that the action is one in contract, that will be the nature of the suit. The drawback to basing the action
on breach of contract, however, is that the measure of damages is generally
5
more limited than would be the case if the suit were predicated on a tort.
In making the determination as to whether the gist of action is tort or
contract, the court will consider, inter alia, the context of the complaint, as
was done in Keirsey v. McNeemer.6 In Keirsey the declaration consisted of
an intermingling of tort and contract concepts. The court there decided
1 The plaintiff's second count was directed toward having the court toll the statute
of limitations on the basis of fraudulent concealment of the cause of action by the defendant. Ill. Rev. Stat. Ch. 83, § 23 (1963). "If a person liable to an action fraudulently
conceals the cause of such action from the person entitled thereto, the action may be
commenced at any time within five years after the person entitled to bring the same
discovers that he has such cause of action and not afterwards."
2 Il1. Rev. Stat. Ch. 83, § 15 (1963). "Actions for damages for injury to the person .
shall be commenced within two years next after the cause of action accrued."
3 Miller, The Contractual Liability of Physicians and Surgeons, 1953 Wash. U.L.Q.
413; See generally, Prosser, Torts § 32 (3d ed. 1964).
Id. at 416.
5 Miller, supra note 3, at 424.
4

6

197 111. App. 173 (4th Dist. 1915).
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that the prayer for relief was directed toward recovering damages arising out
of "negligence" and "unskilled treatment" and thus was fundamentally a
tort action. This basically has been the reasoning of most courts where the
7
plaintiff has sought damages for bodily injuries.
The rule which was earlier accepted without question by the majority
of the jurisdictions is that the statute of limitations on a malpractice action
begins to run immediately upon completion of the operation.8 Proponents
of this rule suggest that the wrongful act is complete and the plaintiff's
injury inflicted when the operation is performed. Thus, it has been held
that there is at that time a complete cause of action and the statute of
limitations should begin running.9 This same line of thought has prevailed
in cases dealing with injuries arising from torts other than negligently performed surgical operations. Thus, in Leroy v. City of Springfield,10 the
Illinois Supreme Court held that where the plaintiff was allegedly injured
by the city's defective sidewalk, his cause of action arose and the statute of
limitations began to run when the injury was first sustained despite the
fact that its full extent could not be known for some time thereafter.
The fact that a party is totally ignorant of his injury will not serve to
toll the statute where the above mentioned rule is followed. This principle
is well established in other areas of the law. Illustrative of this point is the
Illinois case of Lancaster v. Springer," a case cited by the defendant in the
instant case. There, an action was brought questioning the validity of two
deeds to certain property. The deeds in question had allegedly been transferred thirty-seven years prior to the institution of the suit. The court held
that, in the absence of an affirmative act by the defendant to conceal a
cause of action, the failure of the plaintiff to learn of the cause of action
did not prevent the operation of the statute of limitations.
In an instance such as the Mosby case, however, the inequitable result
which is obtained by denying an injured party his day in court is readily
apparent. A statute of limitations is not intended to prohibit valid causes
of action. Its purpose, instead, is to protect a defendant from vexatious
delays or fraudulent suits. Thus, arguments have been raised against allow7 Norton v. Hamilton, 92 Ga. App. 727, 89 S.E.2d 809 (1955); Robins v. Finestone, 308
N.Y. 543, 127 N.E.2d 330 (1955); Young v. Crescente, 132 N.J. Law 223, 39 A.2d 449 (1944);
Mirich v. Balsinger, 53 Cal. App. 2d 103, 127 P.2d 639 (1942); 70 C.J.S., Physicians and
Surgeons § 57 (1960).
8 "In the case of torts arising quasi e contractu, the statute usually commences to
run from the date of the tort, not from the occurrence of actual damage. And ignorance
of the facts on the part of the plaintiff will make no exception to the rule, though he
discovers his injury too late to have a remedy. This will be the case too, even where the
defendant has betrayed the plaintiff into permitting the time to elapse in fruitless
inquiries and negotiations." 2 Wood, Limitation of Actions 839, § 177 (4th ed. 1916).
9 Gangloff v. Apfelbach, 319 Ill. App. 596, 49 N.E.2d 793 (1st Dist. 1943); 54 C.J.S.,
Personal Injuries § 174 (1960).
10 81 Ill. 114 (1876).
11 239 111. 472, 88 N.E. 272 (1909). See Jackson v. Anderson, 355 111. 550, 189 N.E. 924
(1934); 54 C.J.S., Personal Injuries § 174(b) (1961).
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ing the statute to work against an injured party who could have had no
knowledge of the wrong done him. It is contended that to allow such a suit
after more than the statutory time limit has elapsed would not be a violation of the spirit of the statute in that the suit is not intended to defraud or
harass; its only purpose is an honest recovery of damages. When the injured
party is denied his action, he is left remediless for an injury which may have
caused permanent disabilities. Finally, in this regard, it must be noted that
statutes of limitations for tort actions are relatively short. Illinois, with a
two year limitation, is no exception.1 2 This period of time may be grossly
inadequate where a party is in the same position as was Mrs. Mosby.
The argument which has been raised in rebuttal to the attacks on the
rule which requires the statute to commence with completion of the operation is that it is only necessary that the plaintiff have knowledge of the
cause of action and not the full extent of the injuries. That is, once the
cause of action is established, all damages which may reasonably be expected
to flow therefrom may be recovered. 13 This position fails to recognize, however, that when there is no knowledge of a cause of action until the statute
has expired, the plaintiff is unjustly precluded from any recovery.
Many jurisdictions, being cognizant of unjust decisions in cases where
the cause of action is not known, have taken steps toward rectifying the
situation. Efforts have been made by the legislative as well as the judicial
bodies. Thus, most states have long had clauses in their limitations statutes
to provide for a tolling of the statute where, for example, the defendant has
defrauded the plaintiff into believing that no cause of action existed, where
the defendant has left the jurisdiction before the statute of limitations has
expired, where the plaintiff is a minor or mentally incompetent, or in
14
various other instances. Illinois has made such provisions in its statutes.
Many courts have recognized that such savings clauses are insufficient
to completely protect a wronged party and have turned to reinterpreting the
statute of limitations itself. This has led to at least two new rules as to when
the statute of limitations should commence.
The first of these two rules, the "end of treatment" rule, is based on
the continuous tort concept. It provides that the statute shall not begin to
run until the doctor-patient relationship has terminated. This frequently
affords the plaintiff a greater opportunity to discover an injury arising out
of negligent treatment. The rule as it is generally stated is that:
§ 15 (1963).
"The plaintiff could recover for all loss or damage resulting from the breach of
contract or wrongful invasion, constituting the cause of action sued on, regardless of
whether the loss resulted before suit or between the commencement of suit and the trial,
or even if it were merely expected (with reasonable certainty) at the time of the trial that
the loss would ensue in the future." McCormick, Damages 48, § 13 (Ist ed. 1935).
14 Ill. Rev. Stat. Ch. 83, § 19 (absence of party from state), § 20 (death of party
entitled to bring action), § 22 (infants, lunatics, and prisoners), § 23 (fraudulent concealment), § 24 (action stayed by injunction) (1963).
12 Il1. Rev. Stat. ch. 83,
13
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... . [W]here a tort involves a continuing or repeated injury, the

cause of action accrues at, and limitations begin to run from, the
date of the last injury, or when the tortious overt acts cease. 15
While it is applicable to tort actions, the rule has as its foundation contract
principles. Thus, where it is employed, it is held that there exists between
the doctor and patient an implied agreement that the doctor will treat the
patient with the skill and knowledge that is ordinary for the average doctor
in a similar locality. There is, therefore, a duty placed on the doctor to
treat the patient in such a manner. His failure to do so is considered a tort
which continues as long as the substandard treatment continues. The agreement involved need not be express as it is implied by the law.
The reasoning used to construe the post-operative treatment as being
tortious, where the actual overt negligent act which led to the injury was
committed during the operation, is illustrated by the following excerpts
from Illinois Law and Practice.
As a comprehensive definition, it has been stated that a tort is an
act or omission, not merely a breach of duty arising out of a personal relation or undertaken by contract, which is related to harm
suffered by a determinate person in one of the following ways. It
may be .

.

. an act or omission causing harm which the person so

acting or omitting did not intend to cause, but might and should
with due diligence, have foreseen and prevented; it may, in special
cases, consist merely in not avoiding or preventing harm which the
person was bound absolutely or within limits to avoid or prevent. 16
... . Causes of action, however, need not be completely disconnected from contracts in order to constitute torts, and the existence
of a contract may be one of the circumstances required to give a
particular conduct the character of a breach of duty in order to
17
make it tortious.

Thus, there is an intermingling of contract and tort with the result that
the action which is grounded on contract principles sounds in tort. The rule
has found its greatest application in cases involving fact situations similar
to that of the Mosby case.' 8
15 54 C.J.S., Continuing or Repeated Injury § 169(a) (1960).
16 34 I.L.P., Torts § 2, 355 (1958).
17

Id. at 354.

18 This rule prevails in the State of Ohio. In Gillette v. Tucker, 67 Ohio St. 106, 65

N.E. 865, 872 (1902), the court said, "...... The facts in the case show a continuing
obligation upon the plaintiff in error so long as the relation or employment continued,
and each day's failure to remove the sponge was a fresh breach of the contract implied
by the law. The removal of the sponge was a part of the operation, and in this respect
the surgeon left the operation uncompleted."
The rule was discarded in Ohio in McArthur v. Bowers, 72 Ohio St. 656, 76 N.E. 1128
(1905), but readopted in Bowers v. Santee, 99 Ohio St. 361, 367, 124 N.E. 238, 240 (1919),

wherein it was said: "The law should not require impossible or unreasonable things.
It should not impose upon the patient a duty that he can only know through expert
knowledge which he does not possess, but as to which he is compelled to accept the judgment of his physician or surgeon."
For other cases on this point see Huysman v. Kirsch, 6 Cal. 2d 302, 57 P.2d 908 (1936);
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The "end of the treatment" rule, however, has not been accepted in all
instances and especially where the plaintiff has had reason to know of his
injury before the doctor-patient relationship has ended. Thus, it is stated
that: "The cases which have considered this question hold that even though
the treatment has not yet terminated, the limitation period commences to
run from the time the patient discovers the pertinent facts." 19
Where the "end of the treatment" rule has been rejected, it has been
rejected on the theory that the entire wrong was committed at the time of
the operation and that the subsequent treatment was in itself free of any
tortious conduct. This line of reasoning divorces the initial wrongful act of
the doctor from his subsequent treatment of the patient. Therefore, the
argument runs that the post-operative treatment is not a continuing tort
that originated with the operation, but rather that it is a separate and
unrelated act that cannot be considered wrongful for mere failure of the
doctor to correct the earlier malpractice.
The better view, in this observer's opinion, is the one which was
expressed in Gillette v. Tucker 2° that the relationship of doctor and patient
imposes a duty on the doctor to treat his patient in a skillful manner and to
apprise him of his ailments. As long as the patient remains within the doctor's care, the doctor has the duty to use his skill to correct the malady for
which the patient underwent the operation. This duty, of course, arises from
the implied contract existing between the doctor and patient.
If it can be said that there is a continuing tort where the doctor fails
to correct the malpractice during post-operative treatment, it is clear that
the statute of limitations should not begin to run until the treatment ceases.
The general rule as to when the statute of limitations shall begin to run in
the case of a continuing tort is well expressed in the following quotation.
In general, where a tort involves a continued or repeated injury,
the statute of limitations does not begin to run until the date of
the last injury or when the tortious overt acts cease. Thus where
the gravamen of the action is the continuance of a nuisance, an
action may be brought within the statutory period after the date of
the last injury, notwithstanding more than
the statutory period has
2
elapsed since the creation of the nuisance. 1
The second rule which has been used to avoid the harshness of the rule
that the statute shall begin to run immediately upon completion of the
operation, is that the statute shall commence only when the injured party
discovers or has reason to know of the cause of action. This is the rule which
Mrs. Mosby requested the court to apply in the principal case.
Bowers v. Olch, 120 Cal. App. 2d 108, 260 P.2d 997 (1953); Thatcher v. DeTar, 351 Mo.
603, 173 S.W.2d 760 (1943).
19 Annot., 80 A.L.R.2d 383 (1961).
20 Gillette v. Tucker, supra note 18.
21 25 I.L.P., Limitations § 53, 221 (1958).
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The "discovery" rule was employed in Ayers v. Morgan, a Pennsylvania
case, wherein the court said:
Laches becomes a barrier to the institution of a law suit because
the injured person has slept on his rights, but if somnolence has
not corroded away his claim to recover, the law welcomes his action
to recover what has wrongfully been taken away from him. And in
such a situation one may not be charged with dreaming away his
vigilance would not
rights to recover if even the most watchful
apprise him of the damage being done.22
In Fernandi v. Strully, a New Jersey case, in which a wing nut was left
in the plaintiff's body during an operation and not discovered until the
period allowed by the statute of limitations had run from the time of the
operation, it was stated that:
Departing from the ordinary rule in this special type of situation so
as to allow the patient to maintain his legal action after he knows
or has reason to know of the existence of his claim would avoid
flagrant injustice to him without unduly impairing repose or
prompting 2litigation
... too uncertain and too speculative to be
3
encouraged.
In Spath v. Morrow, a Nebraska case very similar to the Mosby case in
that the defendant negligently left a needle in the plaintiff's body following
a surgical operation, the court stated:
The statute of limitations is a statute of repose; it prevents recovery
on stale demands .... The statute is enacted upon the presumption that one having a well-founded claim will not delay enforcing
it beyond a reasonable time if he has the right to procede. The
basis of the presumption 24is gone whenever the ability to resort to
the courts is taken away.
The theory which is used to support the "discovery" rule is that no
cause of action arises until the plaintiff discovers or should have discovered
the injury.2 5 In order that this theory be accepted it is necessary to either
make knowledge by the plaintiff a necessary ingredient for a cause of action
or refuse to recognize that an injury exists until such time as the plaintiff
should have become aware of it.
To make the plaintiff's awareness of the injury an element of a cause of
action necessary to start the statute of limitations would be to depart from
the older and well established rule that such is not necessary. 28 An even
stronger reason for not requiring as much before the statute would commence, at least in Illinois, is that such a requirement was probably never
397 Pa. 282, 291, 154 A.2d 788, 792 (1959).
35 N.J. 434, 442, 173 A.2d 277, 281 (1961).
24 174 Neb. 38, 41, 115 N.W.2d 581, 583 (1962).
25 Ehlin v. Burrows, 51 Cal. App. 2d 141, 124 P.2d 82 (1942); Ayers v. Morgan, supra
note 22; Fernandi v. Strully, supra note 23; Spath v. Morrow, supra note 24; See 54 C.J.S.,
Limitations of Actions § 174 (1960).
26 2 Wood, Limitations of Actions 839, § 177 (4th ed. 1916).
22
23
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intended by the legislature. Since the statute of limitations is a purely
statutory time limit placed on the institution of law suits, the intent of the
legislature in enacting the statute must be considered. The present Illinois
Statute of Limitations was originally passed in 1872. At that time there was
much less question as to when a cause of action accrued than there is presently. It was fairly well understood that a cause of action arose when a
tortious act was committed. 27 As the statute contains no definition of a
cause of action, it is reasonably safe to assume that the legislature intended
the popular meaning of the word to apply. Further, the legislature has not
seen fit to amend the law despite the fact that the courts have taken this to
28
have been the intent of the statute.
For the courts to refuse to recognize that an injury had been sustained
prior to the time it was discovered by the plaintiff in a case such as Mosby
would amount to little more than pure judicial fantasy. This, however,
appears to be the basis of the Ayers case in which the court said, "The
injury is done when the act heralding a possible tort inflicts a damage which
is physically objective and ascertainable."2 9 A court order stating that no
injury had occurred until that injury was discovered would do little to alter
the fact that a needle has journeyed through Mrs. Mosby's body sowing
destruction each inch of its trip. Nor would it be of much solace to Mrs.
Mosby to know that a court of law did not look upon her as being injured
until she discovered the reason for her pain and incapacity.
Hence, while it does seem just in a situation such as that presented in
the principal case to allow the plaintiff to have his day in court, it is not
within the authority of the judiciary to reshape the statute to make room
for knowledge of the injury as a necessary element of a cause of action, nor
to blind itself to the fact that an injury exists. Thus, unless it can be said
that there was a continuous tort, the courts cannot properly allow an action
brought after the expiration of the statutory period merely on the ground
that the plaintiff was ignorant of his right. If such a disposition of the case is
inequitable, then the situation should be remedied by appropriate legislation.
Prior to Mosby, the specific issue involved in the principal case had not
been considered by an Illinois court above the trial level. Several cases dealing with the question of when the statute of limitations should begin to
run when the plaintiff was not aware of the full extent of his injuries until
after the statutory period had passed held that the statute begins to run
from the time the injury is first inflicted. 30 These cases all dealt with situa27 Ibid.
28 Those

cases which were cited in the opinion on the Mosby case include: Leroy
v. City of Springfield, 81 I1. 114 (1876); Calumet Elec. St. Ry. Co. v. Mabie, 66 I11.
App.
235 (1st Dist. 1896); and Gangloff v. Apfelbach, 319 Ill. App. 596, 49 N.E.2d 795 (lst Dist.

1943).

29

397 Pa. 282, 290, 154 A.2d 788, 792 (1959).

30 Leroy v. City of Springfield, supra note 28; Calumet Elec. St. Ry. Co. v. Mabie,

supra note 28; Gangloff v. Apfelbach, supra note 28.
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tions wherein the injured party was actually aware that some injury had
been sustained before the end of the statutory period. On that basis they
are to be distinguished from the Mosby case.
Therefore, Mosby v. Michael Reese Hospital was a case of first impression at the appellate level in the Illinois Courts. As such, it is bound to
serve as precedent for later hearings of similar cases in the state, and it is
likely that under the existing statutory law of Illinois the result will be the
same in subsequent cases. However, Mosby did not make any changes in the
existing case law of the state; it merely extended that rule which already
prevailed.
It is important to note, however, that the court was not pleased with the
opinion it felt constrained to hand down in the principal case. Justice
Dempsey, speaking for the court, expressed the opinion that a more equitable result could have been obtained by commencing the statute of limitations at such time as the plaintiff became aware of the malpractice. That
the court felt this to be beyond the scope of its power, however, was expressed
by Justice Dempsey's final comment that, "Relief must come from the legis31
lature and not from the courts."
In Mosby, while the resulting decision was harsh on the plaintiff, it was
the only decision at which the court could arrive. The "end of treatment"
rule could not have been employed as Mrs. Mosby had not remained within
the care of the hospital long enough to bring her action within the statutory
time period under the provisions of that rule. And, for the court to allow
the suit on the ground that the plaintiff was merely ignorant of her cause
of action would have been to flout the statute, as interpreted by this writer,
by not setting it in motion when the cause of action accrued. Therefore, the
court was compelled to apply the rule which starts the statute of limitations
immediately upon the infliction of the injury. In this instance that was
immediately upon the completion of the operation.
Until there is a legislative reform, the courts shall continue to be
obliged to issue judgments which are inequitable in cases where the plaintiff, though not defrauded by the plaintiff, remained ignorant through no
fault of his own, that a cause of action existed for him.
E. WM. BEDRAVA

CONTRACTs-EXCULPATORY

CLAUSE-CONTRACTUAL

EXEMPTION

LIABILITY FOR NEGLIGENCE HELD ABSOLUTE DEFENSE-The case of

FROM

Owen v.

Vic Tanny's Enterprises,48 Ill. App. 2d 344, 199 N.E.2d 280 (1st Dist. 1964),
provides an opportunity to reexamine the question of the validity of contractual clauses which purport to exempt one of the contracting parties
from the legal consequences of his own negligence.
3' Mosby v. Michael Reese Hospital, 49 Ill.
App. 2d 336, 342, 199 N.E.2d 633, 636
(1st Dist. 1964).

